We have the admin login only allowing logins from our HQ (IP limited). Yet, they have all been compromised?
Both the admin and USER portals were vulnerable. Either one would be able to be used to exfiltrate the LOCAL accounts (not AD/LDAP) including users and admins.
Maybe the bug "NC-58339" for devices on SFOS v17.5 MR10, MR11 and MR12 could be another vector of attack. "Local ACL Exceptions" will not work if there is an Any-Any Drop Firewall rule configured.We had the "Local ACL Exceptions" for User portal access only from one country. Because this exceptions was not working and portal was accessible to whole Internet.community.sophos.com/.../sfos-17-5-mr12-local-service-acl-exception-rule-still-not-working
We still have NO explanation whatsoever how an attack could have been performed if both users and admin access were opted out on WAN (and everything except LAN)
This is now after weeks requesting it.
just a final note, thanks to Pavol who pointed me to
And yes I tested and proofed this (also on 17.5.12), TCP/8094 is open on the WAN interface! This could be another leak where the SQL-injection occurred.
Firewall consultant since 1995Astaro consultant since 2001Sophos partner since 2012BERGMANN engineering & consulting GmbH, Wien/Austria
You REALY tested it on WAN ???
I mean, you have no rule Firewall rule allowing such traffic on WAN, and all access via WAN are opted-out, and yet traffic can flow tru WAN via 8094 ?!?!?!
Are you kidding me ?!?!?!
No I'm not kidding :) Just try it yourself, simple use one of the free online scanners to probe the TCP port 8094 on the WAN-IP of a Sophos XG, eg. https://ping.eu/port-chk/ or https://portchecker.co/ or others.
It seems that this service is per default always open for any network, no matter if you have the SPX Encryption for email configured or not. And as the release notes shows, this service was vulnerable for "Blind pre-auth SQLi" bevor 17.5 MR12.
You must actively change the "Allowed networks" in Email -> Encryption -> SPX portal settings! As a work around I've only allowed #Port1 do disable this service on the WAN.
For me it's now enough. We stopped selling this boxes already bevor two years, but now we will also replace the remaining ones (to another brand).
The fact is, SPX Portal is open by default. What other flowers are dormant in XG ?
Indeed. Open.on one firewall.
Should I expect both MTA mode and legacy mode behave the same ? I.e. port 8094 open ?
I have search Sophos web site regarding this, and the fact that port 8094 was always open have already been a major concern to many.
Well. The other work around is to install another firewall between WAN and XG. I mean, one that does only what it is asked to do. And do not what it is not asked. And one that has real log viewer.
The more I test, the more i'm puzzled. One of our firewalls test open at one time and closed afterward. It is not consistent.
The attack specifically targeted the underlying code of the admin and user portals. We have no evidence the attacker targeted the SPX encryption portal which is different underlying code than the other two. However, the KBA states that "firewalls manually configured to expose a firewall service (e.g. SSL VPN) to the WAN zone that shares the same port as the admin or user portal were also affected". So if a customer exposed the SPX encryption portal on the admin or user portal, which is not the default, it becomes potentially susceptible.
Thanks for the answer.
But from what I have posted already, it is not my case.
All accesses to everything except VPN were opted out everywhere but LAN. On all firewalls.
So the attack description Sophos provided is certainly inacurate.
So ??? What happened ?