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I'm trying to find documentation about the network isolation of applications ran in the sandbox. Specifically, I'm trying to quell concerns that some malware/worm couldn't touch the sandbox host machine, but it could spread to neighboring computers on the network. I've googled for it, but to no avail.
In case anyone else comes here looking for this info, I think I have found what I was looking for here: https://www.sandboxie.com/SandboxHierarchy
"Files that are created or modified on a remote network share are redirected into the sandboxed share\\servername\\sharename folder."
That answers my question about how Sandboxie handles an attempt by the malware to modify files on a remote system:
A big misperception is that if you implement different VLANs in different CIDR blocks/network numbering, you’ve achieved network segmentation. This couldn’t be further from the truth. To achieve actual segmentation, the hosts in one VLAN should not be able to reach every port of every asset in the other VLANs. In true network segmentation, you would set the default gateway of the VLAN on the switch to the firewall where the traffic can be further scrutinized based on specific ports, protocols walmartone, and traffic direction. As an alternative, but less scalable, is using VACLs (VLAN Access Control Lists) but solution can quickly become unmanageable, especially in large-scale enterprise deployments. These are however, quite suitable for smaller networks that have 1 or 2 core switches.