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exploit prevision loadlib error when opening office docs

Hi,  we have just got exploit prevention installed on-premise, but certain users are having issues opening office docs and PDFs.  When they try to do so, the file closes immediately with a message about exploit prevention.  Looking in the computer details tab in SEC, it shows the event as LoadLib.

 

I have had to disable protection for these programs as it's preventing genuine files from being opened.  Why is this happening??



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  • Hi,

    Can you paste here the entire event log entry for the detection(s)?

    Regards,

    Jak

  • hi, the windows event log you mean, or Sophos?  where would i find that info?

  • Hi Jak

    The DLL belongs to a Langenscheidt dictionary for translation german-french, german-italian. We use this application since 2002 and some of our users like it a lot.

    The results on virustotal.com are OK.

    Since today we know much more, when it happens. If this Langenscheidt dictionary application is started on client, everytime if the user makes an Keyboard entry on word or IE, the Sophos Exploit Alert will close word oder IE. Because just a small number of users are using this Langenscheidt dictionary, all other client computers do not have any exploit alerts. 

    The alert Pop up from sophos is so small and at lower right corner of the screen and only for about 3 seconds visible. So the users didn't notice, why word was closed.

    This happens on Windows 7 Computers and is no problem on Windows 10 Computers. It looks like, not Sophos is working "strange", the word or IE is loading this DLL. We don't know why, because there is no link from this Langenscheidt application to word or IE. Windows 10 works different and doesn't load this DLL.

    The thumbprints are the same from the different clients. One for the word and an other one for the IE.

    The WhiteThumbprints REG_MULTI_SZ works fine. We just did some succesfull testing and tomorrow the registry with this two thumprints will be loaded on all clients.

    I look forward, that Sophos will implement this in the Sophos Management Console and we do not have to take care about registry files. This would be nicer.

    Actually it works and we will leave it this way.

    Thanks a lot and best Regards,

    André

  • We are seeing similar issues, linked to Adobe DC, and Outlook.exe, when opening specific pdf attachments. Whilst we could use exclusions, what if the actual attachment did contain malicious code, would we get the same exploit warning? If we exclude both Adobe and Outlook, we would not get any indication of problems

     

    Mitigation   LoadLib
    Platform     6.1.7601/x86 v583 06_3a
    PID          8472
    Application  C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroRd32.exe
    Description  Adobe Acrobat Reader DC 17.9
    EIP          5AEF4A58 (hpvpldrv09.dll)
    Heap address 20BB0000
    Length       512KB
    20BB0000  4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00  MZ..............
    20BB0010  B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ........@.......
    20BB0020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    20BB0030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 D8 00 00 00  ................
    20BB0040  0E 1F BA 0E 00 B4 09 CD 21 B8 01 4C CD 21 54 68  ........!..L.!Th
    20BB0050  69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F  is program canno
    20BB0060  74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6E 20 69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20  t be run in DOS
    20BB0070  6D 6F 64 65 2E 0D 0D 0A 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  mode....$.......
    20BB0080  DA 55 9C 8C 9E 34 F2 DF 9E 34 F2 DF 9E 34 F2 DF  .U...4...4...4..
    20BB0090  97 4C 67 DF 80 34 F2 DF 97 4C 71 DF FA 34 F2 DF  .Lg..4...Lq..4..
    20BB00A0  B9 F2 89 DF 9D 34 F2 DF 9E 34 F3 DF D5 34 F2 DF  .....4...4...4..
    20BB00B0  97 4C 76 DF 4B 34 F2 DF 97 4C 60 DF 9F 34 F2 DF  .Lv.K4...L`..4..
    20BB00C0  97 4C 63 DF 9F 34 F2 DF 52 69 63 68 9E 34 F2 DF  .Lc..4..Rich.4..
    20BB00D0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4C 01 04 00  ........PE..L...
    20BB00E0  91 64 B4 4E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 E0 00 02 21  .d.N...........!
    20BB00F0  0B 01 09 00 00 50 06 00 00 16 01 00 00 00 00 00  .....P..........
    20BB0100  E0 88 04 00 00 10 00 00 00 60 06 00 00 00 00 10  .........`......
    20BB0110  00 10 00 00 00 02 00 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    20BB0120  05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 07 00 00 04 00 00  ................
    20BB0130  00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00  ................
    20BB0140  00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00  ................
    20BB0150  A0 D9 06 00 70 00 00 00 FC D3 06 00 28 00 00 00  ....p.......(...
    20BB0160  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    20BB0170  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 07 00 D8 38 00 00  .........0...8..
    Process Trace
    1  C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroRd32.exe [8472]
    "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroRd32.exe" /p /h "C:\Users\justine.scott.L83045\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook\O7T7GNLV\Invoice - 108685 - Bovey Tracy  Chudleigh Practice - 160617_0734.pdf"
    2  C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE [5880]
    3  C:\Windows\explorer.exe [5164]
    4  C:\Windows\System32\userinit.exe [5296]
    5  C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe [676]
    winlogon.exe
  • Hi Gary

    Do all clients have the same thumbprint in the HitmanPro.Alert Events?

    After winlogon.exe is a thumprint like this:

    4  C:\Windows\System32\userinit.exe [5296]
    5  C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe [676]
    winlogon.exe

    Thumbprint
    124afc63523f51c4844e3e7fad64003a03341eb59d021aab845a1925a80365de

    Regards,

    André

  • I think the reason you're not seeing a path here is the way the library hpvpldrv09.dll is being loaded by AcroRd32.exe.  The most common call to load a library into a process is to call LoadLibrary - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms684175%28v=vs.85%29.aspx.  i.e. you just supply a path and the module is loaded.  I assume this is what's happening for the other examples on this page where the path is given and you don't see the first bytes of the module as you do here.  Importantly you also get a thumbprint generated for exclusions.

    However, The LoadLibrary mitigation must also consider, under the same umbrella, the loading of modules using what's known as reflective DLL injection.  Here is a simple test app, that when compiled the exe and dll it would trigger the LoadLibrary mitigation, if it was a "protected" application.

    https://github.com/stephenfewer/ReflectiveDLLInjection

    In this cases you don't appear to get a thumbprint which I assume would mean, the only thing to exclude/auth this would be to add the exclusion under:
    https://cloud.sophos.com/manage/endpoint/config/settings/exploit-mitigation-exclusions

    ...which would exclude the entire process from mitigation.

    I think you would need to email support and ask if the thumbprint generation will be included in the future for all scenarios that trigger a LoadLib mitigation.  Then you would be able to exclude just this DLL being injected into the process (for LoadLib) rather than the process performing the loading.

    It is a little odd to use that technique, so it would be worth thoroughly investigating that the module loaded and the software it belongs to is legit.  If you search for "reflective dll injection" on Google you'll get an idea of why I would be a little cautious.

    Jak

  • Hello Jak!

    Is adding thumbprint to register only working solution to avoid crashing Word, Acrobat, ... because of \\*.dll?

    Regards,

    Miha

  • Hi Jak

    Do you know, if there is a new solution for configuration exclusions in sophos exploit prevention?

    This regkey is not working stable:

    HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\HitmanPro.Alert\

    If sophos exploit is updating during the day, the Hitmanpro.Alert WhiteThumbprints key will be deleted and restarts the HitmanPro.Alert Service.

    We do have trouble again and again.

    Best regards,

    André

  • Hello!

    There should be coming soon (March) new version of SEC 5.5.1 with better assistance for managing exceptions. In March there should also be version of HitmanPro.Alert.

    Regards

  • Hello Miha Kralj

    I am looking forward to a new solution for managing expections and hope it is doing a better job.

    Thank you,

    André

  • In Firefox ESR 52.6 x32, we do not get the loadlib error and subsequent Firefox crash. 

    In Firefox ESR 52.7 x32, we DO get the loadlib error and crash when accessing Flash content.

    In Firefox ESR 52.7 x64, we do not get the loadlib error.

    Our solution was to upgrade our machines to ESR 52.7 x64.

  • Hi everyone,

    When it comes to Exploit Mitigation and if you suspect it could be a false positive the best way to deal it would be to collect the below details and contact support so that they can take it forward.

    * Information on the application triggering the detection.
    * A copy of the following folder or gather all folders if multiple folders exist: C:\Windows\CryptoGuard\reverted_xxx
    * The output of the Sophos Diagnostic Utility (SDU).

    Regards,

    Gowtham Mani
    Community Support Engineer | Sophos Technical Support

    Knowledge Base  |  @SophosSupport | Sign up for SMS Alerts
    If a post solves your question use the 'This helped me' link.

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